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ABSTRACT

THE NEGLECT OF DIVORCE IN MARITAL
[TITLE] RESEARCH: AN ONTOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE WORK OF JOHN GOTTMAN
[Name
of Student]
Joseph
Andrew
Ostenson
Department of Psychology
Master of Psychology

This thesis
why the
[Typeexplores
your abstract
in divorce
here.] rate has remained relatively stable over the past
few decades, even in the face of rapidly growing social sciences – particularly the
branch associated with the study and treatment of marriage – through an analysis of the
work of John Gottman. This thesis chiefly claims that divorce is not addressed in
marital research. It is argued, however, that far from being intentional on the part of
researchers, the disregard for divorce in the marital research is actually due to
underlying, unrecognized assumptions. Specifically, this thesis analyzes the most
fundamental assumptions – the ontological assumptions – upon which the investigation
of marriage is conceptualized. The body is divided into three parts: First, the apparent
absence of divorce in the marital literature is discussed, providing a starting point for
the ontological analysis. Second, a section on ontology sets up the analysis. It begins

with an introduction to two categories of ontological assumptions. These assumptive
[Continue your abstract here if necessary.]
frameworks are used to guide the analysis of the marital literature. The final part
analyzes John Gottman’s research as a case example of the marital literature,
uncovering the ontological assumptions of his work and demonstrating that many of
his assumptions are potentially problematic for addressing divorce. After briefly
wrapping up the arguments herein contained, the thesis discusses an alternative
ontology which provides a framework whereby, if employed, marital researchers can
begin to more adequately address the divorce epidemic.
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1
Marriage is one of the most highly valued social institutions among Americans
today (Waite & Gallagher, 2000), and yet paradoxically, it is as fragile as ever (Fowers,
2000) with a dissolution rate at around 50%. Consequently, divorce has become a big
issue among social science researchers in the past several years. Their endeavor to
uncover the dangerous implications of divorce have brought to our attention some
concerning facts: the divorced are worse off financially (Hao, 1996; Lupton & Smith,
2003), in general experience poorer health (Lillard & Waite, 1995), and by and large
experience more social disorders, such as depression (Marks & Lambert, 1998), than
married individuals. Divorce is even harder on the children involved. For instance,
children of divorce are more depressed (Ge, Natsuaki, & Conger, 2006) and more prone
to other psychological illnesses and criminal behavior than those raised in married
households (Pryor & Rodgers, 2001). Truly divorce is one of the most distressing social
ills facing our nation today.
Unfortunately, the divorce rate has been fairly stable for nearly three decades. The
1970s saw the greatest historical increase of divorce in the United States, peaking in the
early eighties at just over 50% (Munson & Sutton, 2004). Since 1981, the divorce rate has
declined slightly, but not by much. At the beginning of this decade, it stood just below
50%, though several researchers were still projecting that a majority of marriages would
end in divorce (Faust & McKibben, 1999). Gottman (2002), perhaps the most renowned
marital researcher, has consistently claimed that over half of all first marriages will end in
divorce (see also Gottman, 1999; Gottman & Levenson, 1999; Gottman, 1994) and others
have related a similar story more recently (Rice, 2005; Schoen & Canudas-Romo, 2006).
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Recent history has also seen a significant increase in social scientific research,
which represents the scientific attempt to answer the problems of human relationships.
Among the many problems addressed by the social sciences, divorce was specifically
targeted beginning in the 1940s, and since, the study of marriage has become a discipline
of its own—marriage and family therapy (MFT; Nichols, 1992). For decades now, both
the science of marriage and the other social sciences have grown rapidly into the force
they are today, arguably as large and as influential as the harder sciences of biology,
chemistry, and physics. After 40 years of the social sciences doing battle with divorce
and trying to enhance marriage, why has the divorce rate remained relatively the same?
The purpose of this thesis is to explore one facet of this intriguing question. As I
will show, divorce is not specifically addressed in marital research. Far from this being
intentional on the part of researchers, I will argue that this disregard for divorce is
actually due to underlying, unrecognized assumptions guiding marital research today. To
make this case, I analyze the most fundamental assumptions upon which the investigation
of marriage is conceptualized – ontological assumptions. I first discuss the apparent
absence of divorce in the marital literature, providing a starting point for the ontological
analysis. The analysis then begins with an introduction to and an outline of two
categories of ontological assumptions. These assumptive frameworks are used to guide
the analysis of the marital literature. As an example of the marital literature, I have
chosen to analyze the work of one of the most popular and well-cited marital researchers
in psychology today, John Gottman, for reasons that will be made clear below. The
purpose of the analysis will be to uncover the ontological assumptions of John Gottman’s
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research and determine to what extent it is based on assumptions that are potentially
problematic for addressing the dissolving and maintaining of marital relationships.
Marital Research and Divorce
While it seems logical to expect a growing population of marital researchers and
therapists to make some dent in the divorce rate, few scholars doubt the “success” of
marital therapy. In fact, marital therapy’s success has been well documented empirically
(Shadish & Baldwin, 2003). But a closer look at the definition of success reveals
something interesting: outcome instruments rarely – if ever – define success as
“preventing divorce.” Few outcome studies do follow-up beyond immediate posttreatment (i.e., nine months) and therefore cannot determine whether therapy has
prevented divorce from occurring one or more years later (Gottman, 1994). The questions
found within outcome measures are even more revealing. For instance, in the Dyadic
Adjustment Scale, considered by many the most commonly used measure of marital
therapy outcome (Dutcher, 1999; Busby, Christensen, Crane, & Larson, 1995), none of
the 32 questions actually measure the fact of divorce, and only one even mentions
divorce. Most other outcome measures focus not on divorce prevention, but on agreement
between spouses and individual positive affect. If outcome measures fail to measure
divorce prevention, then “successful” marital therapy may not prevent divorce.
Indeed, most scholars do not consider the preventing of divorce as one of the
primary goals of marital therapy. For Kadis and McClendon (1998), who attempt to
represent the whole of marital therapy in their Concise Guide to Marital Therapy, marital
therapy is successful when couples “[feel] better as a result of the experience” (p. 12). In
other words, success is not about preserving the marriage; rather success is about
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establishing and maintaining good feelings among the various members of the
relationship. Moreover, the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists
(AAMFT) does not profess divorce prevention as a primary goal of its professional
members (AAMFT, 2007). It is true that many researchers assume that “agreement” and
“good feelings” among partners will help prevent divorce, but this cannot be known if it
is not measured. This raises an obvious question: why is divorce not measured?
What is or is not measured in any scientific pursuit is based upon the theories
espoused by researchers; this includes, among marital researchers, definitions of success,
follow-up procedures, and types of outcome measures. However, while theories indicate
to researchers what to investigate, the theories are themselves laden with assumptions
(Slife & Williams, 1994). These assumptions, while often implicit, are the very core of
the theories that guide scientific investigation. Therefore, if something is not being
measured—in this case, divorce—then the most crucial factor in this absence are the
assumptions underlying the theories of explanation.
Ontology
While there are many types of assumptions, this thesis deals primarily with
ontological assumptions. Ontological assumptions are “fundamental, taken-for granted
assumptions about the ultimate reality of things” (Slife, 2005, p. 157). These types of
assumptions guide how researchers and practitioners understand phenomena. For
example, during the early middle ages, the Western world was dominated by Christianity,
which assumed the spiritual dimension of humanity to be the ultimate reality.
Consequently, understanding psychological illnesses often emphasized supernatural
(spiritual) explanations (Hergenhahn, 2005). Alternatively, many modern neuroscientists
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assume that ultimate reality is matter or material, thus when they look to understand
mental illness, they resort to biological understandings (Hedges & Burchfield, 2005). In
other words, the way reality is conceived, as evidenced both in the middle ages and
presently, guides the different kinds of understandings that occur. Thus if marital
researchers conceptualize relationships based on certain specific ontological assumptions,
these conceptualizations will help determine how successful marriage is understood, and
thus how it will be defined as a measure of therapeutic outcome.
In this section, I will discuss two ontologies which have been singled out by other
scholars as relevant to the social sciences. The first is an ontology that is said to have
been adopted by the western intellectual tradition. By this I mean it is an ontology upon
which much of modern science (and thus modern psychology) was built, beginning in the
renaissance and on into the enlightenment and the 19th century (Taylor, 1989). This
ontology became the metaphorical spectacles through which social scientists saw the
world and upon which both theory and research in the social sciences became based
(Bishop, 2007). The second ontology has risen historically, in part, as a reaction to our
contemporary ontology. While it is not the only alternative to our contemporary ontology,
it is one that is being considered useful and viable in helping to account for the same
phenomena for which modern psychology has accounted (Reber, 2007). Following the
work of Slife (2005), I have labeled these ontologies, respectively, abstractionism and
relationality (see also Reber, 2007; Nelson, 2007).
The purpose of this section is to clarify and compare these two ontologies. I will
first define the two ontologies generally. Then I will answer the question “What is a
marriage?” from both an abstractionist and a relational ontology. This will help to
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identify concretely how marital relationships are conceptualized from both frameworks. I
answer this question in three stages: first, the “where” of marriage will outline how
marriage is understood in relation to its location; the “who” of the marriage will define
for us how spouses are understood from each ontological perspective; and finally, the
“how” of the marriage will define how the spouses are understood to relate to one
another, in light of the “where” and the “who.” Finally, I will revisit the original question,
“What is marriage?” before proceeding with the analysis.
Defining ontologies
Abstractionism. An abstractionist ontology essentially takes abstractions to be
fundamentally real, and all persons, places, or things are best understood as abstracted
from one another (Slife, 2005), or abstracted from their context. Context refers to
particulars of the person, place, or object, such as its immediate surroundings or its
history. Consider a hammer. From an abstractionist perspective, a hammer is best
understood as an object in and of itself, removed from its context of tool box, work
bench, user, or history of function, and as having properties which do not change even
when the context changes. In other words, a hammer is a hammer, whether it is being
used to pound nails or to keep papers from flying away. It retains properties which define
it as a hammer in spite of the context. An abstractionist’s focus is always on sameness
across context; that which is bound to context becomes secondary. Individuals, in this
sense, are understood in a similar manner, in that they have unchangeable properties
which are contained within the “skin” of the person and carried—unchangeably—from
context to context, such as home, work, or school, or from one relationship to another.
One can see where psychological science has adopted an abstractionist framework when
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one considers the notions of “personality,” “identity,” “trait,” or “self” (Slife &
Richardson, in press), which are often considered a set of essentially unchangeable
characteristics that are maintained from context to context (Myers, 2007). The
abstractionist will not deny that there are changeable aspects of the individual, however
change is not fundamental. Instead, the abstractionist will seek unchangeable laws that
are said to govern the changes, which laws are another form of abstraction. For the
abstractionist, individuals “begin and end as [unchangeable], self-contained
individualities” (Slife, 2005, p. 158) and understanding what is real—whether it concerns
an individual or a relationship—requires an understanding of the self-contained, and thus
abstracted, properties of individuals.
Relationality. On the other hand, ontological relationality supposes that all things
are first and foremost in relationship with one another. Persons and objects share their
being with the context of which they are a part and thus are best understood in relation to
their context. Consider once again the example of the hammer. The relationist would
claim that, because the hammer shares its being with the context, its identity can
fundamentally change as a consequence of a changing context. It is best understood as a
hammer when it is pounding nails and it is best understood as a paperweight when it is
holding down papers. Likewise, the identity of individuals can fundamentally change
when their context changes. Unlike the abstractionist, the unchanging is not understood
as the fundamental, with the changeable as the secondary. A relationist attends to the
unchanging and the changing nature of the individual as he or she navigates different
contexts. The fundamental reality of any individual consists both of the individual and his
or her constitutive relationships, which includes the changing and unchanging. It is true
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that the individual may maintain similarities across contexts, but the relationist is just as
concerned with the essential differences that occur when an individual changes contexts.
It is the similarities (unchanging or constant parts) and differences (those parts which do
change) which constitute the whole of, and thus make up the fundamental reality of, an
individual or a relationship. The best understanding, from this relational perspective, is an
understanding of the whole.
It is important to note that abstractions and relationships inescapably exist from
both ontological frameworks. The question from either ontology is not so much “what
exists” as “what is considered fundamental.” From an abstractionist perspective, the
abstracted and unchangeable is fundamental, and relationships are considered secondary.
In other words, the abstractionist acknowledges the existence of relationships—even
values relationships—but sees the relationships as secondary to the self-contained
individuals (Reber & Osbeck, 2005). Indeed, the abstractionist would even see
relationships as internalized or a part of the individual. For this reason, abstractionism is
sometimes called a weak relationality (Slife, 2005). On the other hand, from a relational
perspective, relationships are fundamental and abstractions are secondary. Individuals are
always in relationship and the relationships are crucial to understanding the individual.
From a relational ontology, individuals cannot be understood except in relationship, thus
relationality is called a strong relationality.
What is a relationship?
It goes without saying that this rather thin account of the two categories of
ontology is somewhat vague and needs to be further fleshed out. For that purpose, a
thicker rendition of each of the categories is now presented in answer to the very specific
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question, “What is a marriage relationship?” As stated above, I begin with the “where”
and the “who” of the relationship and then finish with the “how.”
Where? The “where” of the marriage relationship concerns how the marriage is
understood in reference to its location; in other words, what role the location plays in
understanding the marital relationship. For the abstractionist, the best way to understand a
marriage relationship is abstracted from the “where,” or from the context (e.g., a
laboratory). The abstractionist is primarily concerned with the unchangeableness of the
relationship and where contextual elements change, such as time and location, the
abstractionist will attempt basic explanations independent of context. This might include,
as mentioned earlier, unchangeable laws that account for the changes. The more real part
of the relationship is expected to maintain a certain constancy—with little, if any
variation—in the face of changing contexts. “Where” the relationship occurs is outside of
context, or abstracted from context, such that the changes that occur in context do not
impede a pure understanding of the fundamentally unchanging relationship. Any time
contextual elements such as time, emotion, or culture are factored out of an explanation
of the marriage, the explanation is abstractionist.
An example might further clarify the abstractionist “where.” Often, a married
couple who seeks therapeutic help will be seen in the therapist’s office. If the therapist
attempts to understand the couple’s relationship, the understanding will be derived in a
different context (the office) than where the troubled relationship most frequently occurs
(e.g., at home). Because an understanding is assumed to be attained outside of the context
of the home, it is considered to be fundamentally independent of the context of the home.
What the abstractionist therapist expects to understand is a troubled relationship that is
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basically unchangeable, thus carried from the home to the therapist’s office.
Consequently, coming to the office should not change any important, fundamental
characteristic of the troubled relationship, for any home-bound (contextually-bound)
property of the relationship is secondary to the unchangeable, abstracted relationship
important for the therapist’s understanding. Additionally, the unchangeable relationship
is best understood when it is abstracted from its other changeable contexts, such as in a
laboratory.
From a relational ontology, relationships must be understood “where” the
relationship occurs. In other words, relationships are contextually bound and cannot be
fully understood without an understanding of the relationship in context. Culture,
situation, time, and space all help to constitute any marriage relationship (Slife, 2005) and
a full understanding of the relationship (its changes and its stability) is not achieved
independent of the context, but rather as these contextual elements change. A relational
therapist would assume that seeing a couple in the office would change the context
wherein the couple most often relates, which might significantly change the relationship.
The relationist would value the changes from context to context as much as that which
does not change, for both similarities and differences are part of the relationship. A
therapist from this ontological perspective might also choose to see the couple in the
context wherein the relationship most frequently occurs, such as at home, which might
contribute to a fuller understanding of the couple’s relationship across different contexts.
The therapist would also recognize that his or her very presence might alter the
relationship, given the change in context which has occurred. Neglecting the role of the
context (including spatial, temporal, or cultural location) would be detrimental to any
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attempts at intervention because the therapist’s understanding of the relationship would
be severely impaired. A relational ontology assumes that a contextual understanding is
the best understanding.
Who? The “who” of the relationship refers to how the individuals of the marriage
are understood. From an abstractionist ontology—or a weak relationality—the “who” of a
relationship is best understood abstracted from his or her particular context, including
from his or her spouse. The “who” is considered self-contained (i.e., the self contained
independently of his or her context) in that, though his or her qualities are developed
through socialization, the qualities become a property of the self-contained individual
(Reber & Osbeck, 2005). For instance, when information is exchanged in a relationship,
the information can affect an individual, but only insofar as the information has been
taken from the outside of the individual and “processed” within the individual. As the
“who” of marriage is self-contained for the abstractionist, then any understanding of a
relationship necessitates first and foremost an understanding of the individuals of the
relationship. Indeed, as Reber and Osbeck claim, understanding and explaining
relationships from this perspective focuses on the “thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of
each party, for it is assumed that these factors ultimately determine whether and how the
relationship is maintained” (p. 65).
The quality of a marital relationship, from this perspective, would depend on the
positive “thoughts, feelings, and behaviors” of each spouse concerning the relationship.
In other words, the quality of the relationship would be judged at the level of the
individual because the individual is the primary (or, ontological) reality of the
relationship. In fact, as mentioned previously, such is the case for several of the measures
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that purport to assess marital quality. Many do so by measuring individual affect (e.g.,
Index of Marital Satisfaction; Positive Feeling Questionnaire) or personal thoughts and
feelings (e.g., Dyadic Adjustment Scale; Locke-Wallace Marital Adjustment Test)
concerning the relationship (see Corcoran & Fischer, 2000). Using such measures to
assess the relationship is in effect assessing each individual’s self-contained, and thus
private, emotions and personal properties, a practice that assumes abstractionism. In sum,
the “who” of the abstractionist marriage are two self-contained individuals.
Relationality assumes human relationships to be “the fundamental reality of
[human] existence” (Jackson, 2005, p. 210) and abstracting an individual from his or her
relationships is to misunderstand that individual. The “who” from a relational perspective
must be understood as a nexus of constitutive relationships, or in other words, as at least
partly constituted by his or her relationships with others. The important thing to keep in
mind here is that the individuals of any marital relationship each have a role in
constituting the whole of the relationship, and thus the identity of their spouse.
Consequently, significant changes to one spouse would mean a change in the other
spouse, for in sharing their being, the couple will help to constitute one another. From
this perspective, the reality of the “who” of a marriage is intimately tied to the
constitutive marital relationship. Thus the quality of the marriage is less about the
individual affect and more about the relationship itself. For instance, a quality marriage
relationship from a relational perspective would not be a severed relationship, as in the
case of divorce. I discuss the implications of not accounting for divorce below, but for
now, suffice it to say that to be relational, assessment must focus on the relationship first
(which includes the status of the relationship), not on the individual.
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How? Let us now turn to “how” married couples relate. For the abstractionist, the
fundamental reality of the individual is self-contained, abstracted from both context and
other individuals. Consequently, the essence of individuals does not begin in relationship;
relationships must be created (Slife, 2005). Because of the focus on abstractions, from
this perspective the most important parts of the self are the abstractions which pertain to
the individual—such as values, beliefs, and thoughts—which are said to be essentially
unchangeable and acontextual. When individuals come together with the intent to create a
relationship, this is done through “common abstractions” (p. 168). And because
abstractions are “individual and potentially unique,” then individuals who differ must
“find or create some commonality” as part of building their relationship. A good
relationship, from an abstractionist perspective, is one in which two self-contained
individuals share their individual, abstracted values, beliefs and thoughts; that is, they
have them in common. When they are not common to begin with, then to maintain the
relationship, it is necessary to build some sort of commonality. For instance, a husband
might attempt to persuade his wife to believe what he believes; or the couple might
choose to “tolerate” the differences that exist between them – agree to disagree. The
important thing to keep in mind is that some form of agreement is essential for
maintaining a relationship from an abstractionist ontology.
One example of how this plays out in marital therapy research can be gleaned
once again from outcome measures. Many instruments that purport to measure marital
quality (e.g., Dyadic Adjustment Scale) ask couples about their level of agreement; the
more the couple agrees, the better the quality of relationship (Corcoran & Fischer, 2000;
see also Spanier, 1976). This is the same idea which sparked the founder of
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eHarmony.com, Neil Warren (1992), to write that “similarity is critical” (p. 48) and
propose individual traits such as values, intelligence, and interests as fundamental to
creating a successful marriage. This type of matching is a boon from an abstractionist
perspective, because it is assumed that two individuals cannot create a relationship until
they share similar abstractions, and that the relationship is best when conceptual
agreement is highest.
On the other hand, the relationist holds that individuals are always in relation to
one another by virtue of their shared context and their shared being; they are two parts of
the same relational whole. Thus, a relationship need not be built from this perspective.
Instead, the question of “how” from a relational ontology deals with the quality of what
already exists. The best relationships are those in which the married individuals each live
into what is real about the relationship, the reality being the shared context and
constitutive being. For an individual to be able to live into his or her constitutive
relationship, he or she must embrace the relationship as a whole, including both the
similarities and the differences which maintain a good relationship. In this case,
complementary differences are just as important as similarities to “good” relationships as
they help to provide richness and “spice” to a marriage. On the other hand, there can be
similarities or differences that are potentially destructive to the marital relationship.
Again, the focus is on the quality of the relationship, not on the how similar or different a
couple might be.
A relational ontology also necessarily extends the understanding of “how” the
married relate beyond just the individuals themselves. Indeed, while the abstractionist
ontology speaks primarily of the two individuals involved in a marriage relationship, the
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strong relationist considers a broader context than simply the couple itself (e.g., culture).
The other “parts” of this context—for example, culture, history, spatial location, etc.—
play as large a role in constituting the relationship as the individuals themselves play.
Thus, understanding the reality of any marriage, for the couple’s or the researcher’s sake,
would mean at least some understanding of the several parts that constitute the whole
relationship. One particularly important part of a relational ontology is what Charles
Taylor (1989) called “inescapable frameworks” (p. 3). These frameworks, according to
Taylor, guide, usually implicitly, the decisions we make between right and wrong, but are
not dependent on our personal “desires, inclinations, and choices” (p. 4). These deep,
moral intuitions are part of the shared context of the couple and help to constitute the
marriage relationship just as strongly as do the individuals in the relationship. This is
because the couple is inseparable from these frameworks (they are “inescapable”), thus
no decision is made by either individual without some sort of reference to the
frameworks.
A relational ontology presupposes an understanding of individuals that is
inextricably connected to (and affected by) the whole of human experience, which
includes culture, history, and moral frameworks. Understanding those individuals who
are married and how they relate requires understanding their deep relationship to context.
An understanding like this helps to illuminate some of the values that should be
maintained in developing a good marital relationship, values that can be very different
than simply individual preferences. As Taylor says, some values are an inescapable part
of the culture, thus they may even be contrary to individually held beliefs, yet still need
to be embraced by the couple before a good marital relationship can develop. In other
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words, from a relational perspective, a married couple cannot merely decide on their own
“how” best to relate without understanding the inescapable moral frameworks which
form the background of any relationship. A strong relationality encourages – even
requires – this deep understanding, whereas a weak relationality only requires an
understanding of the self-contained individuals along with their self-contained
preferences.
Revisiting the question. By way of revisiting the question “What is a
relationship?” it is important to keep in mind what I noted previously: both categories of
ontology acknowledge the existence of both relationships and abstractions; the question
is simply, which is fundamental. From an abstractionist, or weak relational perspective,
what is real or fundamental is the abstracted and acontextual – objects do not share their
being. Thus relationships are at best secondary to abstractions, such as self-contained
individuals. In order for relationships to matter, that which happens “outside” of the
individual must be incorporated to the inside before it matters. But the important object
of investigation in this case remains the self-contained individual, not the relationship
itself. On the other hand, relationality, or strong relationality, is “relational all the way
down” (Slife, 2005, p. 159). Objects begin and end in relationship, they share their being
with one another and with their context and cannot be fully understood except in relation
to one another.
Before moving into the analysis of the literature, I would like to connect the
absent status of divorce in marital research to the previous discussion on ontology. The
primary focus of any research or intervention strategy from a weak relationality
(abstractionist ontology) will assume at the outset that an individual is first and foremost
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self-contained—abstracted from his or her context, including the context of the
relationship. From this perspective, couples are composed of two self-contained
individuals; their relationship is of a secondary nature, one that cannot be the ultimate,
foundational focus from a weak relationality. Thus any scientific investigation from this
perspective will focus on the individuals in relationship. The relationship will likely not
be the focus. Yet divorce is the dissolving of the relationship. To research divorce is, in a
sense, to research the relationship. This type of research may be unintentionally avoided
if the researcher assumes a weak relationality; in this case, one is limited by one’s
ontological assumptions to attend first and foremost to the individual, not to the
relationship, and thus not to divorce. One can see, then, how the discipline’s ontological
assumptions might lead them to unknowingly ignore divorce.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to the analysis of an important portion of
the marital literature and its underlying ontological foundation. One explanation for the
absence of divorce in marital research may be that researchers for the most part assume a
weak relationality. I will analyze the work of one marital researcher – one who may
represent an important portion of the field – and uncover his ontological assumptions. I
will also take up the issue of whether he addresses divorce at a fundamental, ontological
level.
Analysis
Having differentiated between abstractionism and relationality in marital
relationships, the next step in addressing the absence of divorce in marital research is to
go to the literature itself. Unfortunately, the marital research literature is too vast to cover
in the time and space allowed for this project. Therefore, I have chosen one man’s work –
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that of John Gottman – to represent the major portion of this body of marital research.
There are two reasons for which I feel justified in addressing the important ontological
issues of this literature through his work: the depth and breadth of his research and his
unusual concern with the issue of divorce.
Reasons for choosing Gottman.
The first reason is the depth and breadth of his research as a member of the
community of marital research, which has established him as a significant player and
influence in the field. Gottman has done research with over 3000 couples over a 30 year
period of time. In that time, he and his colleagues have studied marriage from the
physiological (e.g. Gottman & Levenson, 1992) and the psychological (e.g. Carrere,
Buehlman, Gottman, Coan, & Ruckstuhl, 2000) perspective of marital satisfaction; they
have done both short-term and long-term marital therapy outcome research (Gottman,
1999); and they have recently modeled their own theory of marriage mathematically
(Gottman et al., 2002). He is one of the most prolific researchers in marriage and family
therapy (Jencius & Duba, 2003). He has created a research and intervention program rich
with his own creativity, including the “Gottman Method Couples Therapy,” a program
which certifies “Gottman Relationship Clinic” therapists across the country, and even
internationally. Gottman has also written several books to popular lay clerics and the
public (e.g., Gottman & Silver, 1999). Though his career is not without controversy (cf.
Hafen & Crane, 2003), Gottman has been widely acknowledged by several scholars as
one of the most influential researchers in the field of marriage and family therapy
(Fincham & Beach, 1999; see also Cornelius, Alessi, & Shorey, 2007; Parra & Busby,
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2006; Hicks, McWey, Benson, & West, 2004; Fincham, 2003; Stanley, Bradbury, &
Markman, 2000).
The second reason for choosing Gottman has to do with one area in which he
stands out among marital researchers: his concern with divorce. Unlike many researchers,
Gottman has been particularly interested in divorce. In fact, he has expressed concern
about the inadequacy of short-term follow-up in marital therapy research (e.g., Gottman,
1994) and the apparent ineffectiveness of marital therapy (e.g., Gottman, Coan, Carrere,
& Swanson, 1998). Quite contrary to the claim that I made earlier – that marital
researchers fail to address divorce – Gottman is one marital researcher who is constantly
addressing divorce. He has even published a book entirely about predicting divorce
(Gottman, 1994). Indeed, Gottman is one of the few who joins me in the claim that
marital researchers and clinicians are not really dealing with the “crisis” of familial
dissolution in the United States (Gottman, 1999).
As I am being critical of the field, I felt it important to choose to analyze the work
of one who is both an integrated member and a critic of the field himself and judge just
how far his criticisms go. Gottman is one of the few who tackles the question of divorce
so explicitly, so it seems likely that he will be less inclined to make assumptions that
inhibit the deep discussion of divorce in the larger discipline. In this sense, this analysis
tests how prevalent abstractionism is in the discipline, even among those concerned with
divorce.
In sum, the following analysis is intended to uncover the ontological foundation
of Gottman’s research. I will first introduce the foundation of Gottman’s theorizing—
individual affect—and discuss how it is used by Gottman. I will then analyze core
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concepts which characterize the bulk of Gottman’s research. First, I will analyze the three
legs of Gottman’s “core triad of balance,” which help to illuminate his theoretical
understanding of positive and negative affect. Next, I will analyze a core concept of
Gottman’s Sound Marital House theory, creating shared meaning. This analysis will
demonstrate the ontological assumptions upon which Gottman has relied in constructing
his major marital research program.
Introducing Gottman.
Gottman began building his research program with a decade of longitudinal
research in the 1980s. After a scrupulous review of the marital literature (see Gottman,
1994), Gottman set out with some of his colleagues to demonstrate the connection
between marital stability and positive or negative interactions. In 1992, he and Levenson
published their longitudinal research, claiming that negative processes (both behavioral
and physiological) lead to marital dissatisfaction, which in turn lead couples to consider
divorce. Nearly all of Gottman’s theorizing, research, assessment and therapeutic work
with couples has been based on this idea that negative affect leads to divorce, extending
into present times (e.g., Gottman et al., 2002). Indeed, affect (positive or negative) is the
key to understanding Gottman’s theory of marriage, called the “Sound Marital House”
(Gottman, 1999). According to the Sound Marital House theory, the “two necessary
‘staples’ of marriages that work are (1) an overall level of positive affect, and (2) an
ability to reduce negative affect during conflict resolution” (p. 105). Gottman has
developed further explanations concerning how these two “staples” develop in marriage
and how intervention strategies can be targeted in such a way as to foster these staples
when they fail to develop.
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Positive and negative affect for Gottman and his colleagues is not as simple as
how one claims to feel. Indeed, one of the purposes of Gottman’s research program was
to go beyond self-report data (Gottman, 1994). For this reason, Gottman proposed what
he called the “core triad of balance” (Gottman, 1993b, p. 70). Gottman has stated that
“every relationship is a system that develops its own balance or stable steady states, with
respect to the ratio of positivity and negativity in behavior, perception, and physiology”
(Gottman, 1999, p. 33). He operationalized positive and negative affect as behavior,
perception, and physiology and claimed that the balance of positivity and negativity
between the three elements would determine marital stability; hence the core triad of
balance (Gottman, 1993b). The amount of research devoted to this core triad lends some
evidence to its significance for Gottman and his colleagues (e.g., Gottman & Notarius,
2000, 2002; Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998; Gottman & Levenson, 1992;
Gottman, 1993a), which includes separate projects addressing interactive behavior (e.g.,
Gottman & Driver, 2005; Gottman, 1993a; Gottman & Levenson, 1999b; Driver &
Gottman, 2004), physiology (Levenson & Gottman, 1985; Levenson, Cartensen, &
Gottman, 1994), and perception (Hawkins, Carrere, & Gottman, 2002; Carrere,
Buehlman, Gottman, Coan, & Ruckstuhl, 2000).
It is important to understand the three elements of the core triad and their relation
to one another, as their relation reveals the nature of affect according to Gottman’s
theorizing. This section explores these three elements, each in turn, and uncovers the
ontological foundation of Gottman’s understanding of affect. The question which
outlined our discussion of ontology (“What is a marriage relationship?”) will be an
implicit guide as the core triad reveals what Gottman believes about the “where” and the
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“who” of the marital relationship. As each of the elements are defined and explained, the
ontological assumptions made by Gottman should become clear. Behavior will be
discussed first, followed by physiology and finally, perception. A brief concluding
statement on the core triad will then transition into a discussion of the core triad in the
context of the Sound Marital House.
Core Triad of Balance
Interactive behavior. The manner in which Gottman researches and discusses
behavior reveals an underlying weak relationality. In researching behavior, Gottman
generally has couples interact for about fifteen minutes (e.g., Gottman & Levenson,
1992). He records this interaction and then codes and analyzes each of the couple’s
behaviors using the Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF; see Gottman, 1999;
Gottman & Krokoff, 1989). The SPAFF is intended to “[integrate] non-verbal and
physical cues, voice tone, and speech content to identify specific affects” (Jones, Carrere,
& Gottman, 2005). By integrating these several cues, a single behavior is then identified
as either positive or negative, or exhibiting positive or negative affect. Both his use of the
SPAFF and his classification of behaviors as positive or negative reveal Gottman’s
underlying abstractionism.
An example will help to illustrate how, by using the SPAFF, Gottman routinely
abstracts behaviors from the larger context which gives them meaning. The SPAFF is
used to identify very specific behaviors, such as belligerence (Gottman, 1994). According
to the SPAFF, belligerence is considered a manifestation of negative affect. In order to
find belligerence, one is required to look for the following cues: “the jaw…thrust forward
and mouth open as if the speaker is daring the other person to hit him or her on the

23
jaw…finger pointing…cruder language…[and] the rising inflection of the challenging
question” (p. 300). While attending to several observable cues might seem to constitute
somewhat of a context of behavior, the SPAFF fails to attend to a larger context, which
may prove of great importance. For example, it may be that an individual is simply
inclined to “thrust forward” his or her jaw and habitually point a finger in process of
making an important point during an intense discussion, though he or she is not being
belligerent. Knowing about this inclination (part of the context beyond the interview)
might lead an observer to different conclusions concerning the jaw being “thrust forward”
and the “finger pointing.” By using the SPAFF, Gottman sees certain behaviors as
belligerent regardless of the larger context. But we see that this larger context (in the
example above) gives the behavior a different meaning than belligerence. For Gottman to
use the SPAFF to classify negative behaviors (such as belligerence), he is of necessity
abstracting behaviors from their meaningful context, thus manifesting abstractionist
assumptions.
Even to call behaviors “negative” is itself a form of abstracting, as it assumes that
that behavior will have the same “negative” function in a differing context. Doing so
without considering the context wherein the behaviors occur might neglect instances in
which the behaviors are actually beneficial (and thus, positive) to maintaining the
relationship, but Gottman consistently fails to take these contexts into account. For
example, defensiveness is another behavior that Gottman considers “negative.” He
defines it as “any attempt to defend oneself from a perceived attack” (p. 44). And yet, it
may be that during one of Gottman’s interview sessions, a woman is being wrongly
accused by her husband of having an affair. It is possible that her lack of defensiveness
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indicates to her husband her guilt. In other words, the relationship might turn sour
because the husband mistakes her lack of defensiveness as evidence of the affair. In this
case, lack of defensiveness would be considered the negative behavior, while
defensiveness may have been considered positive. But Gottman abstracts defensiveness
by calling it negative, neglecting the larger context which might give a positive meaning
to defensive behavior.
Physiology. We see abstractionism in another of Gottman’s indicator of positive
or negative affect: physiology. As with behaviors, Gottman claims that there are positive
and negative physiological indicators; in other words, some specific physiological states
are supposed to indicate a propensity toward negative affect in marital interactions, and
thus, toward divorce. However, as I will show, the states are literally self-contained states
that individuals are supposed to carry from context to context, an indication of
abstractionism.
This occurs especially in Gottman’s laboratory. Couples are brought into the lab
and hooked up to machines that measure their physiology for 20 minutes. Fifteen of those
minutes are spent interacting, while the first 5 are spent in silence where base rates were
taken. (e.g., Gottman & Levenson, 1985; Gottman & Levenson, 1992). Bringing
individuals into a lab is considered an abstractionist practice, as it removes individuals
from their context, and the couples here are treated as though their physiology is the same
in the lab as it is at home. For example, Gottman claims that, during the resting period,
husbands who “had heart rates 17 bpm higher” and wives who had “faster flowing blood”
were more inclined toward divorce than husbands with lower heart rates and wives with
slower blood, respectively (Gottman, 1999, p. 75). Gottman has removed these
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individuals from the context of everyday life while claiming they maintain a constant
physiology. Yet one could easily envision more than one couple, whose everyday life is
stressful or demanding, resulting in naturally higher heart rates for the men and faster
flowing blood for the women. Indeed, if everyday life is more stressful for a couple,
bringing the couple together might actually lower the husband’s heart rate significantly,
though it is still unusually high. But the experimental procedures used by Gottman cannot
account for this context. Instead, the physiological state of the husband and the wife are
assumed to be relatively unchanging from one context (e.g., at home or at the office) to
the next (the lab), indicating an abstractionist tendency to abstract physiology from its
context.
It is true that physiology itself is not understood by Gottman entirely acontextual;
indeed, it is synchronized with the individual’s interactive behavior (Gottman &
Levenson, 1992). In other words, the physiologies of an individual are paired with the
synchronous behaviors of that same individual and together signify whether that
individual is experiencing a positive or a negative affective trend. According to Gottman,
negative affect is not merely a higher heart rate, abstracted from the context of human
behaviors; the higher heart rate is synchronized with the negative behaviors which are
manifest in the couple interaction. But while this synchronous approach to studying
physiology may seem more contextual and less abstractionist, the small context—that of
physiology and behavior—is still abstracted from the larger context. Indeed, both
behavior and physiology are investigated by Gottman acontextually. Synchronizing an
individual’s decontextualized behavior with his or her private, self-contained physiology
is to essentially situate the experience of negative affect within the individual. In other
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words, an individual’s negative affect is a product of that individual’s behavior and
physiology. In essence, Gottman investigates what he believes is an acontextual,
abstracted individual.
Though it may seem at times that Gottman considers the married couple as a
context, it is important to point out that the individual who is understood abstracted from
his or her context is the self-contained individual. Thus for Gottman, the couple is
composed of two self-contained individuals. In other words, couples begin and end as
individuals, indicating a weak relationality. Physiology and behavior both are contained
within the “skin” of the individual. Even the concept of “interactive behavior” implies
two separate entities acting and then reacting, or individuals “acting on each other from
the outside” of one another (Slife, 2005, p. 158). Individuals, for Gottman, are not
constitutive of one another, as they would be from a strong relationality; they are not
“relational all the way down.” In other words, Gottman is here assuming a weak
relationality. Understanding the third element of the core triad sheds further light on this
fact.
Perception. This leg of the core triad deals specifically with how
“spouses…perceive and interpret positive and negative actions of one another” (Gottman,
1999, p. 68). What perceptions are and how they develop over time is an important
indicator of Gottman’s weak relational assumptions. As we have already seen, Gottman
considers individuals to be fundamentally self-contained; that is, abstracted from their
context. Perceptions, for Gottman, exist within this abstracted self, or as he himself states,
“in the mind” of the individual (Gottman, 1999, p. 72). Thus they belong to an abstracted,
independent self such as that which is characteristic of a weak relationality. Furthermore,
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perceptions play a role in “driving emotional expressions, behavioral interactions, and
satisfaction in marriage” (Carrere et al., 2000, p. 42). This is not a contextual individual,
for it is an abstracted perception, from within, which drives his or her action, rather than a
response based on the context.
Of course, perceptions do not simply arise on their own, independent of a context,
and Gottman recognizes this. They arise, claims Gottman, after a period of positive or
negative behavioral interactions (Gottman et al, 2002). But while these behavioral
interactions occur between individuals, one cannot deny the private, abstracted nature of
the perceptions: they exist inside the mind. Self-contained perceptions are the ultimate
effect of the behavioral interactions. For example, if a couple has distressing behavioral
interactions, distress maintaining perceptions are the consequence (Gottman, 1999). In
other words, the behavioral interactions are internalized before they affect the
relationship through the individuals’ perceptions. So while perceptions might originate in
the context of behavioral interactions, perceptions are understood by Gottman as
fundamentally abstracted from the context of the behavioral interaction. This is a weak
relational position, or an abstractionist position.
Conclusion. To summarize the abstractionism underlying the core triad: couples’
behaviors are understood abstracted from the larger context of their everyday
environment (e.g., typical behaviors); the physiology of the individual, in connection
with behaviors, is understood to be abstracted from its everyday environment (e.g., high
stress environment), as well as from the context of the couple; and perceptions, which
both drive and are driven by the other two core elements, are private, self-contained
expressions, abstracted from the context of the spouse. Given this understanding of the
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core triad, then, affect is meant by Gottman to be a self-contained, acontextual expression
and perception of positivity or negativity. The “who” expressing and perceiving the affect
(through the core triad) is self-contained, abstracted from his or her spouse; likewise,
both spouses are abstracted from the “where,” or the larger context of their everyday
environment. In sum, Gottman’s definition of affect is an abstractionist definition.
Sound Marital House Theory
As the foundation of Gottman’s theorizing, the core triad has proven important in
revealing many of Gottman’s ontological assumptions. Understanding the core triad also
helps one understand his Sound Marital House. The Sound Marital House is Gottman’s
comprehensive theory of the marital relationship, which details the key elements of
establishing a healthy marriage (Ryan, Gottman, Murray, Carrere, & Swanson, 2000). As
I have already stated, the Sound Marital House is founded upon the two necessary
“staples” mentioned above: “(1) an overall level of positive affect, and (2) an ability to
reduce negative affect during conflict resolution” (Gottman, 1999, p. 105). In other
words, a successful marital relationship is built and sustained when the core triad is
balanced in the more positive sphere. The core triad permeates Gottman’s Sound Marital
House, thus it can be concluded that abstractionism also underlies most of the Sound
Marital House. However, there is one particular concept—creating shared meaning—that
seems at first glance to be based on more relational assumptions. In analyzing this unique
concept, Gottman’s conception of “how” couples relate is better illuminated.
Creating Shared Meaning. In calling meaning “shared,” Gottman seems to allude
somewhat to more relational assumptions. To consider meaning shared almost implies
that it cannot be held by one spouse independent of the other. In other words, meaning

29
which is shared does not seem abstracted from one or the other individual, and therefore
seems more relational. As stated above, the self-contained individual of Gottman’s core
triad is an essentially private individual. There are no shared behaviors, only exchanged,
private behaviors; there are no shared perceptions, only private perceptions. That the
couple can even share meanings seems to suggest a more underlying relationality than
much of his theorizing.
But this does not mean that sharing cannot occur from an abstractionist ontology.
Recall that a weak relationality emphasizes commonalities. If Gottman is consistent in
viewing individuals as self-contained, then sharing meaning may just be another way to
say that the couple has a common (private) understanding of meaning. And the fact that a
shared meaning needs to be created from Gottman’s perspective suggests just that. From
a weak relationality, a relationship must be built by individuals who come together and
“share” their commonalities (that is, find common ground). This is essentially what
“creating shared meaning” is for Gottman: it “involves honoring and meshing each
spouse’s individual life dreams, narratives, myths and metaphors” (Gottman, Ryan,
Carrere, & Erley, 2002, p. 161, emphasis added) to create a “new culture that has never
existed before” (Gottman, Driver, & Tabares, 2002, p. 389). In other words, it is up to the
two abstracted individuals to mesh their individual abstractions (dreams, narratives,
metaphors, and myths) in order to create a shared culture that will “deepen and
strengthen the foundation [affect] of their marital friendship” (Gottman, 1999, p. 106). If
Gottman were truly assuming a strong relationality, the creation of a shared meaning
would not be necessary; it would already exist.
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It is also important to emphasize that shared meaning is created, according to
Gottman, by the abstracted, self-contained individuals, independent of any sort of
inescapable moral framework such as those discussed above. In other words, the creation
of shared meaning originates from inside the individuals. No background of context or
culture (wherein frameworks exist) is taken into account. Indeed, it is a new culture that
belongs exclusively to the couple, as Gottman says, “a couple’s unique blend of meaning,
symbol systems, metaphors, narratives, philosophy, goals, roles, and rituals” (Ryan,
Gottman, Carrere, & Swanson, 2000, p. 356, emphasis added). This is a couple ultimately
abstracted from its culture, abstracted from the inescapable moral frameworks
characteristic of a relational ontology.
One of the “inescapable frameworks” of a relational ontology is the valuing of the
relationship itself. In other words, preventing divorce would be valued from a strong
relationality, whether it is valued by the couple or not. One can easily see where this
value is missing from Gottman’s account of creating shared meaning: the purpose of
creating shared meaning is to assure each individual that his or her “personal life dreams
and aspirations come true” (Gottman et al., 2002, p. 301). If a couple “share” the life
dream of being divorced, for no other reason than its convenience, nothing – not even a
cultural value – stands in the way of the couple divorcing. In fact, divorcing would be the
only logical thing for this couple to do, from Gottman’s perspective. Thus we see that
valuing the relationship (an inescapable relational framework) holds little ground to the
“personal life dreams” (or abstractions) of the couple. In conceptualizing “creating shared
meaning,” Gottman is implicitly valuing the well-being of the individual over and above
the well-being of the relationship. And what is more, shared meaning is meant to cycle
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back into the foundation of the Sound Marital House, helping to create the positive affect
characteristic of the Sound Marital House. In order to maintain the well-being of the
individual, divorce might be the solution. If the relationship is not valued over individual
affect, then Gottman’s research is glaringly missing one of the inescapable frameworks of
a strong relationality: valuing the relationship.
In sum, the manner in which Gottman has conceptualized his notion of “creating
shared meaning” is underlain with abstractionist assumptions. From his perspective,
married individuals begin as self-contained individuals and relate to one another weakly.
In other words, they build their relationship on common abstractions, and where common
abstractions do not exist, they are created based on the values of two self-contained
individuals, without reference to the inescapable moral frameworks of the relationship in
its strong relational form.
Conclusion: The Absence of Divorce
In the preceding analysis, I have argued that an abstractionist ontology pervades
the research and theorizing of John Gottman, a key representative of the marital
literature. Understanding Gottman’s underlying ontology may help us better understand
why divorce is largely neglected by the greater body of marital research and literature. I
have already hinted that abstractionism—or weak relationality—might be the reason for
this neglect. Gottman’s own weak relationality helps to reinforce this conclusion. Recall
that from a weak relational perspective, individuals begin and end as self-contained
beings. To understand marriage from this weak relationality means that one’s research or
theorizing focuses primarily on the individuals in relationship; the relationship itself is
necessarily secondary. Another way to put it is the well-being of the relationship (its
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preservation or dissolution) is secondary to the well-being of the individuals involved.
Thus it is entirely possible that researchers have made secondary the well-being of the
relationship for the sake of preserving the well-being of the individual. If that is the case
– and it seems to be – then the dissolution of the relationship, divorce, will only ever be a
legitimate recourse toward preserving the well-being of the individual.
For Gottman, marital stability takes a back seat to individual affect. His only
genuine connection to divorce as a phenomenon is to theorize that when affect is good,
divorce is avoided, and when affect is bad, divorce will occur (Gottman, 1994). There is
no attempt to prevent divorce per se, no valuing of the marital relationship itself, except
to encourage married individuals to increase their positive affective experiences.
Marriage becomes a means to another (individualistic) end. But this seems to be a thin
defense of marriage, for one can easily imagine a couple who decides to divorce as a
means of increasing their positive affective experiences. Even Gottman has said that
sometimes divorce is necessary to preserve the well-being (read, positive affect) of the
individual (Gottman, 1994). In spite of all his talk about divorce and hoping to “solve this
crisis” (Gottman, 1999, p. 4), Gottman is not, at bottom, fundamentally concerned about
it. Instead, he is more concerned about the personal, private affect of the married
individuals.
I do not mean to accuse Gottman himself of being insensitive to the issue of
divorce. Indeed, as I have said, divorce seems to be one concern that drives much of his
research and writing (e.g., Gottman, 2002, 1999, 1994). In fact, one cannot help but sense
more relational undertones in Gottman’s literature which he directs to lay audiences (e.g.,
Gottman & Silver, 1999). Even Gottman’s “love lab” in Seattle is one way in which he is
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attempting to be more contextual, and therefore more relational, about marriages. It may
just be the case the Gottman is not careful about his ontology, at times assuming a strong
relationality in his practice and in his writing to lay populations. What I am suggesting is
that the absence of divorce may just be due to the ontological assumptions upon which
his scientific research is based.
Given that divorce is not a primary concern from an abstractionist perspective,
this might also be a strong indication as to why it seems to be missing in so many other
places in marital research. If a researcher of the caliber and popularity of Gottman, who
seems to talk so much about divorce, is only truly talking about it as an afterthought – or
even as a means toward individual well-being – then it should come as no surprise that
divorce is missing from the larger body of marital research. In a time when marriage is so
important, yet so fragile, marital researchers have every reason to be concerned with
divorce. However, given their ontological foundation, which implicitly guides their
approach to marriage, marital researchers cannot adequately conceptualize divorce nor
make significant contributions toward preventing divorce. Ontologically, the well-being
of the individual is valued above the relationship, thus making divorce secondary to many
other aspects of marriage. If divorce is truly to be a priority among marital researchers,
abstractionism is not the best ontology to adopt.
Implications
Fortunately, abstractionism is not the only ontological option. The alternative
ontology presented in this thesis—relationality—shows promise as a very viable
alternative. As stated previously, valuing the relationship is an inescapable moral
framework that underlies a relational approach. This value would make the marital
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relationship the center of research and therapy, changing the discipline in significant
ways. While social scientists seem immensely concerned with the detrimental effects of
divorce on divorced individuals and their children, these same social scientists are
ignoring divorce at a fundamental, ontological level. To assume a relational ontology
would mean researchers would take the marital relationship serious at the outset.
Marriage would not be considered a means to the individual’s well-being, nor would the
individual be valued over the marital relationship; the focus would be first and foremost
the relationship. By assuming a relational ontology, divorce would of necessity be of
primary consideration, for divorce is the severing of the marital relationship. If divorce is
truly to be a concern, and thus a priority among marital researchers, relationality might be
a legitimate solution.
But the implications of a strong relationality are not limited to researching
divorce. For example, researchers and therapists from this approach would acknowledge
the role that the couple’s context plays in their marital relationship. As a consequence, a
more ethnographic approach might be taken towards research. Understanding and
learning about couples and their marriages would extend beyond the couple and into their
culture, including their life at home and at work, with family and friends – all the
situations and contexts that give meaning to the relationship. This sort of approach to
research would illuminate the complexity of marriage both on the level of the couple as
well as the cultural level, enabling the sort of perspicacity that is restricted by more
reductive methods.
Therapists might also benefit from a more ethnographic approach in therapy. This
might mean intense observation of the couple in context, where therapists, rather than
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bringing couples into their office, would go to the homes or offices of the couples to get a
sense of the context of their marriage. It may necessitate “house calls” when couples are
in the heat of battle, where therapists would process with the couple in context, with all
the nuances that give meaning to the couple and their good and bad times together.
Conflict itself would be approached differently from a relational ontology, in
contrast to how it is presently viewed in the marital literature. It is generally agreed that
conflict occurs over disagreements and that differences are seen as inhibiting of good
relationships, explaining why conflicts need to be resolved. From a relational ontology,
the differences between people are integral to the relationship; that is, they are part of the
identity – the context – of the relationship. Thus differences would be embraced from a
strong relationality and disagreement and conflict would be seen in a more positive light:
as an opportunity to learn and understand more about the other – and the relationship as a
whole – and grow closer together.
Above all, a strong relationality would necessitate an emphasis on the marital in
marital therapy and research. No longer could individuals be the focus of research and
therapy, as is the case for Gottman and a host of his colleagues in the field. Marital
therapy and research would be about the marriage. In this way, the discipline can begin to
take seriously the issue of divorce and begin to truly defend marraige.
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